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Volatility-Managed Portfolios
Managed portfolios that take less risk when volatility is high produce large alphas, increase Sharpe ratios, and produce large utility gains for mean-variance investors. We document this for the market, value, momentum, profitability, return on equity, investment, and betting-against-beta factors, as well as the currency carry trade. Volatility timing increases Sharpe ratios because changes in volatility are not offset by proportional changes in expected returns. Our strategy is contrary to conventional wisdom because it takes relatively less risk in recessions. This rules out typical risk-based explanations and is a challenge to structural models of time-varying expected returns.
Journal Article
Optimal versus Naive Diversification: How Inefficient Is the 1/N Portfolio Strategy?
We evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the sample-based mean-variance model, and its extensions designed to reduce estimation error, relative to the naive 1/N portfolio. Of the 14 models we evaluate across seven empirical datasets, none is consistently better than the 1/N rule in terms of Sharpe ratio, certainty-equivalent return, or turnover, which indicates that, out of sample, the gain from optimal diversification is more than offset by estimation error. Based on parameters calibrated to the US equity market, our analytical results and simulations show that the estimation window needed for the sample-based mean-variance strategy and its extensions to outperform the 1/N benchmark is around 3000 months for a portfolio with 25 assets and about 6000 months for a portfolio with 50 assets. This suggests that there are still many \"miles to go\" before the gains promised by optimal portfolio choice can actually be realized out of sample.
Journal Article
ESG Integration and the Investment Management Process: Fundamental Investing Reinvented
We investigate how conventional asset managers account for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors in their investment process. We do so on the basis of an international survey among fund managers. We find that many conventional managers integrate responsible investing in their investment process. Furthermore, we find that ESG information in particular is being used for red flagging and to manage risk. We find that many conventional fund managers have already adopted features of responsible investing in the investment process. Furthermore, we argue and show that ESG investing is highly similar to fundamental investing. We also reveal that there is a substantial difference in the ways in which U.S. and European asset managers view ESG.
Journal Article
Dynamic Trading with Predictable Returns and Transaction Costs
We derive a closed-form optimal dynamic portfolio policy when trading is costly and security returns are predictable by signals with different mean-reversion speeds. The optimal strategy is characterized by two principles: (1) aim in front of the target, and (2) trade partially toward the current aim. Specifically, the optimal updated portfolio is a linear combination of the existing portfolio and an \"aim portfolio,\" which is a weighted average of the current Markowitz portfolio (the moving target) and the expected Markowitz portfolios on all future dates (where the target is moving). Intuitively, predictors with slower mean-reversion (alpha decay) get more weight in the aim portfolio. We implement the optimal strategy for commodity futures and find superior net returns relative to more naive benchmarks.
Journal Article
Money Doctors
We present a new model of investors delegating portfolio management to professionals based on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge fees. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting fees, but because of trust, fees do not fall to costs. In equilibrium, fees are higher for assets with higher expected return, managers on average underperform the market net of fees, but investors nevertheless prefer to hire managers to investing on their own. When investors hold biased expectations, trust causes managers to pander to investor beliefs.
Journal Article